











This	 special	 issue	 gathers	 and	 enlarges	 upon	 papers	 that	 were	 first	 presented	 at	 the	
interdisciplinary	 ‘Corruption	 Downunder’	 symposium	 held	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Auckland	 in	
November	2015;	most	of	the	papers	published	here	stem	from	the	lively	and	collegial	discussions	














the	 measurement	 and	 understanding	 of	 corruption.	 Before	 we	 describe	 some	 typically	






by	 the	unnecessary	 concentration	of	 economic	decision‐making	 in	 the	hands	of	 governments.	
Neo‐liberal	 evangelising	 against	 public	 sector	 corruption	 is	 generally	 based	on	 the	 claim	 that	
privatisation	and	competition	can	purify	corrupt	state‐owned	enterprise	dominated	economies.	
Moreover,	the	link	between	counter‐corruption	strategies	and	neo‐liberal	constitutionalism	can	
be	 found	with	a	growing	 frequency	 in	 the	policies	and	public	statements	disseminated	by	 the	
International	 Financial	 Institutions	 (IFIs)	 (Brown	 and	 Cloke	 2004).	 Because	 neo‐liberal	 logic	
projects	the	market	as	an	ideal‐typical	space	in	which	efficiency	and	transparency	in	transactions	
can	be	more	easily	obtained,	corruption	can,	the	argument	goes,	be	eradicated	by	privileging	the	
‘hidden	 hand’	 forces	 of	 the	 market,	 expressed	 in	 the	 decisions	 of	 competing,	 self‐interested	
participants.	In	other	words,	privatisation	and	competition,	rather	than	state	controls	on	capital,	
will	 produce	 less	 corruption.	 This	 position	 is	 summed	 up	 by	 one	 of	 the	 most	 prominent	
corruption	experts:	 ‘If	 the	economy	 is	 fully	 competitive,	 then	no	 corruption	can	occur’	 (Rose‐
Ackerman	1978:	208).	There	is	a	certain	(if	taut)	logic	to	this:	if	there	are	less	rules,	then	the	rules	
will	be	broken	less.	The	idea	that	the	capitalist	markets	can	rid	societies	of	corruption	simply	by	
























different	 socio‐economic	 contexts.	Corruption	scholars	 typically	distinguish	between	collusive	
corruption	 (where	 two	 parties	 collude	 for	 their	 common	 benefit)	 and	 extortive	 corruption	




not	 a	major	 problem	 in	 developed	 countries	 (though	 it	 is	 probably	more	widespread	 than	 is	
thought);	it	is	less	common,	for	example,	to	be	asked	to	bribe	a	public	official	in	New	Zealand	and	








same	as	corruption	 in	a	poorer	country	…	the	kinds	of	corruption	risk	 in	a	 rich	
country	are	not	 typically	small	 scale	bribes	 to	 low	 level	officials,	but	 in	 corrupt	




pre‐occupied	with	 extortive	 corruption—bribery	 or	 fraud	 by	 public	 officials—rather	 than	 the	













2014).	 This	 was	 not	 mere	 smearing	 and	 falsehood—though	 there	 was	 plenty	 of	 that—but	
involvement	of	national	security	agency	officials	in	collaboration	with	a	disreputable—and	since	
convicted—blogger,	to	discredit	opposition	politicians.	The	blogger,	who	was	close	to	ministers	
in	 the	 conservative	 government,	 released	 and	 misrepresented	 this	 information	 with	 the	
knowledge	of	the	then	Prime	Minister.	Further,	the	same	right‐wing	blogger	had	accessed	stolen	
information,	 hacked	 from	 the	 opposition	 Labour	 Party’s	 computers,	 to	 be	 similarly	 deployed.	


























finance	 sector,	 weapons	 manufacturing	 and	 trade,	 and	 privatised	 carceral	 ‘services’	 (Whyte	
2015).	 Applying	 the	 same	 general	 logic,	 concentration	 of	 this	 type	 of	 corruption	 might	 be	
expected	 in	 agricultural	 and	 other	 primary	 industries	 in	 New	 Zealand	 and	 in	 mining	 and	
extractive	 industries	 in	 Australia,	 as	 well	 as	 (in	 both	 countries)	 property	 development	 and,	





sheep	 scandal’	 in	 2015	 saw	 ‘[c]laims	 of	 corruption,	 bribery	 and	 lies	 …	 made	 about	 the	
Government’s	unorthodox	scheme	of	flying	live	sheep	to	Saudi	Arabia’	(Edwards	2015).	The	flying	
sheep	 were	 part	 of	 a	 NZ$11.5	 million	 package	 (Kirk	 and	 Vance	 2015)	 granted	 to	 a	 Saudi	
businessmen,	Hmood	Al	Khalaf—with	close	connections	to	that	country’s	royal	family—to	allay	
his	 disappointment	 at	 loss	 of	 profits	 attendant	 on	 New	 Zealand’s	 live	 sheep	 export	 ban.	 The	
Labour	Government	had	prohibited	such	 livestock	exports	 to	Saudi	Arabia	 in	2004,	after	 that	
country	had	rejected	the	unloading	of	an	entire	shipment	of	57,000	sheep	purchased	in	Australia	






influence	with	 the	 Saudi	 royals	 to	 have	 a	 free	 trade	 agreement	with	New	 Zealand	 shelved	 in	
addition	 to	 threatening	 to	 sue	 the	 New	 Zealand	 government	 for	 up	 to	 NZ$30	 million	
compensation.	 The	 innovative	 deal	 to	 recompense	 Al	 Khalaf	 and	 avoid	 these	 threatened	
consequences	included	New	Zealand	government	funding	of	NZ$6	million	towards	development	
of	his	improbable	‘agribusiness	hub’	where	sheep	would	be	bred	in	air‐conditioned	sheds	in	the	
middle	of	 the	 Saudi	desert,	 slaughtered	and	processed	 for	 consumption	 there,	 a	NZ$4	million	
‘settlement’,	plus	NZ$1.5	million	to	fly	900	pregnant	ewes	across	from	New	Zealand.	These	‘less	
than	 transparent	 or	 robust	 processes’	 (Edwards	 2015),	 critics	 have	 pointed	 out,	 would	 be	
criminal	if	they	benefited	a	public	official	rather	than	a	wealthy	entrepreneur	with	influence	over	
public	 officials.	 Sure	 enough,	 the	Auditor‐General’s	 eventual	 inquiry	 (Provost	 2016)	 found	no	




























their	 titles.	 The	NSW	 Independent	 Commission	 against	 Corruption	 (ICAC)	 had	made	 findings	
against	them	of	corruption	in	public	office.	Both	had	been	renowned	right‐wing	‘numbers	men’	





ministerial	 positions	 in	 the	 awarding	 of	 a	 lucrative	 government	 contract.	 Former	NSW	Labor	
Party	Minister	for	Primary	Industries	and	Mineral	Resources,	Ian	Macdonald	(another	prodigious	




this	 crime	 (ABC	News	 2017).	 Eddie	Obeid,	 his	 son	Moses	 and	 Ian	Macdonald	 are,	meanwhile,	
awaiting	trial	for	conspiracy	to	commit	misconduct	in	public	office	over	the	award	of	a	AU$30	
million	coal	mining	lease	that	the	Obeid	family	had	secretively	secured	for	their	cannily	acquired	














from	 its	 Northern	 Australia	 Infrastructure	 Facility	 to	 finance	 the	 rail	 link,	without	which	 the	
project	 is	 not	 viable.	 In	 a	 further	 subsidy,	 the	Queensland	Government	 has	 granted	 the	mine	
unlimited	access	over	a	60‐year	period	to	groundwater,	drawing	from	the	artesian	basin	over	an	
area	of	 thousands	of	square	miles,	 inevitably	degrading	 farmland	where	water	 is	scarce	(Four	
Corners	 2017).	 In	 India,	 Adani	 has	 an	 egregious	 record	 of	 environmental	 harms,	 including	
infringements	of	its	licence	conditions	and	flagrant	breaches	of	regulations,	its	coal	port	at	Vasco	
in	Goa	being	but	one	 instance.	The	company	wields	 formidable	power	as	a	giant	of	the	Indian	




































to	 Shadow	 Assistant	 Treasurer,	 Andrew	 Leigh	 (cited	 in	 Karp	 2016),	 ‘most	 Australian	 tax	
avoidance	is	done	within	current	laws	via	tax	loopholes	the	government	prefers	to	ignore,	not	








accounts	 vested	with	 any	 public	 office	 (Chenoweth	 2016).	 New	 Zealand	 trusts	were	 used	 by	
Mossack	Fonseca	to	hide	funds	from	Panama	companies	set	up	for	the	Chief	of	Staff	to	Malta’s	






If	 this	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 distinctly	 neo‐colonial	 form	 of	 corruption,	 in	 an	 antipodean	 context,	
‘domestic’	 forms	 of	 corruption	 undoubtedly	 have	 their	 origins	 in	 the	 form	 that	 colonisation	
adopted.	 While	 land	 allocation	 to	 those	 favoured	 by	 crown	 officials—and	 to	 the	 officials	
themselves	and	their	families—is	a	common	feature	of	white	‘settler’	colonialism,	the	renovated	
corruption	 inherent	 in	 contemporary	 land	 development	 and	 associated	 zoning	 and	 (lack	 of)	
regulation	 is	 a	key	 feature	of	neoliberalism.	 Jane	Kelsey	 (2015)	 shows	corruption	 related	 top	
property	 development	 to	be	 intertwined	with	 financialisation	 and	actuarialisation,	with	 all	 of	

















These	 are,	 firstly,	 that	 corruption	hinders	 development	 and	 the	 sharing	 of	 its	 benefits,	which	
regularly	leads	to	the	corollary	that	eradicating	corruption	would	deliver	more	development	and	




capitalism;	 it	 is	 not	 all	 that	 ‘primitive.	 It	 stays	 with	 us	 and	 is	 continually	 reinvented	 anew.	
Neoliberalism	 introduces	new	opportunities	and	new	 forms	 in	which	capitalist	exploitation	 is	
intensified	and	extended.	
	
Kristian	 Lasslett’s	 contribution	 closely	 analyses	 corruption	 in	 the	 example	 of	 real	 estate	
development	 in	a	developing	country	context:	 that	of	Papua	New	Guinea.	The	state‐corporate	
crime	involved	is	transnational	and	neo‐colonial,	and	Australian‐based	capital	is	implicated.	Local	
politics	 and	 culture	 are	 important	 factors	 but	 Lasslett	 demonstrates	 how	 deeper	 and	 more	
thoroughgoing	empirical	study	reveals	broader	and	more	underlying	criminogenic	tendencies.	
Lasslett	 sets	 out	 methodological	 innovations	 for	 investigating	 such	 corruption	 robustly	 and	
profoundly,	 and	 these	will	 have	wide	 applicability	within	 critical	 criminological	 and	 political‐
economic	study.	
	









identified	 by	 White	 is	 this	 notion	 of	 security,	 and	 that	 environmental	 wellbeing	 must	 be	




time	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 built	 environment	 in	 New	 Zealand,	 which	 has	 the	 most	 unaffordable	
housing	 in	 the	 world	 (The	 Economist	 2017).	 He	 gives	 the	 political‐economic	 background	 of	
deregulation	 and	 the	 housing	 crisis	 in	 New	 Zealand,	 and	 demonstrates	 their	 disastrous	




subversion	of	 the	public	good	can	underlie	an	apparently	easy‐going	 liberalism,	 just	as	rotten	











particular	 products,	we	 see	 not	 only	 the	 familiar	 forms	 of	 corruption	 in	 bribery	 (or	 ‘gifts’	 or	
funding	or	political	donations)	to	professionals	and	officials	and	researchers	and	political	parties	
and	 representatives,	 of	 fraudulent	 claims	 and	 falsifications,	 and	 of	 ‘revolving	 doors’	 between	
public	office	and	private	enterprise,	but	also	the	corruption	of	science	itself	 in	the	interests	of	
profits	(nothing	new	here)	and	unlawful	breaches	of	human	rights	in	those	same	interests.	The	
right	to	prior,	 free	and	informed	consent,	based	on	adequate	 information,	 to	 ‘any	preventative,	
diagnostic	and	therapeutic	medical	intervention’	is,	Rawlinson	(2017:	89)	points	out,	safeguarded	
under	 international	 instruments	 such	 as	 the	 Universal	 Declaration	 on	 Bioethics	 and	 Human	
Rights.	Suppression	of	medical/scientific	dissent,	public	challenge	and	even	open	debate	is	made	
by	the	state	in	the	interests	of	‘Big	Pharma’	in	respect	of	vaccination;	knowledge	cannot	but	be	




Finally,	Greg	Martin’s	 article	 also	 deals	 with	 the	 erosion	 of	 civil	 liberties	 in	 the	 interests	 of	
national	security	–	 in	this	case	 in	the	context	of	Australia’s	prosecution	of	 the	 ‘war	on	 terror’.	
Martin’s	socio‐legal	analysis	shows	how	democratic	principles	and,	 indeed,	 the	rule	of	 law	are	
ever	more	sacrificed	to	the	expediencies	of	counter‐terrorism.	Secrecy	provisions—and,	in	fact,	
unlawful	cover‐ups	often	facilitated	by	these—are	central	to	this	process.	Asylum	seekers	and	





corruption	 that	 we	 find	 in	 New	 Zealand	 and	 Australia	 are	 not	 visible	 at	 every	 point	 in	 the	
system—we	 are	 certainly	 not	 at	 the	 point	 where	 police	 officers	 and	 public	 officials	 openly	
demand	 bribes	 and	 neither	 are	 we	 at	 the	 point	 where	 regulatory	 enforcement	 is	 routinely	
undermined	by	bribes—then	the	much	bigger	challenge	for	these	countries,	as	we	have	seen,	is	
the	 cosy	 relationship	 that	 exists	 between	 public	 officials	 and	 business	 generally,	 rather	 than	
relationships	 that	 are	 tainted	 by	 bribes.	 A	 caveat	 is	 necessary	 here,	 however.	 There	 is	
overwhelming	evidence	that	these	close	relationships	that	influence	public	policy—ranging	from	
access	to	ministers	and	public	officials,	to	their	favourable	attention	to	the	interests	of	particular	
industries	 or	 corporations	 and	 even	 their	 enthusiastic	 promotion	 of	 these—are	 enhanced	 by	





now	 proposing	 that,	 if	 we	 understand	 corruption	more	 broadly	 as	 a	 set	 of	 relationships	 and	
practices	that	systematically	undermine	the	public	interest,	then	we	can	begin	to	understand	the	
phenomenon	as	one	that	is	embedded	in	the	developed	world.	Christensen,	Shaxson	and	Baker	
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